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censorship of Exit International by the Australian government. By examining euthanasia struggles for
evidence of the five types of tactics, it is possible to judge whether one or both sides use tactics characteristic
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Struggles over euthanasia can be examined in terms of tactics used by players on each side of the issue to reduce
outrage from actions potentially perceived as unjust. From one perspective, the key injustice is euthanasia itself,
especially when the person or relatives oppose death. From a different perspective, the key injustice is denial of
euthanasia, seen as a person's right to die. Five types of methods are commonly used to reduce outrage from
something potentially seen as unjust: covering up the action; devaluing the target; reinterpreting the action,
including using lying, minimising consequences, blaming others and benign framing; using official channels to give
an appearance of justice; and using intimidation. Case studies considered include the Nazi T4 programme,
euthanasia in contemporary jurisdictions in which it is legal, and censorship of Exit International by the Australian
government. By examining euthanasia struggles for evidence of the five types of tactics, it is possible to judge
whether one or both sides use tactics characteristic of perpetrators of injustice. This analysis provides a framework
for examining tactics used in controversial health issues.
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Background
Decades ago, most people died as a result of disease that
ran its course, without significant medical or techno-
logical interventions. Before hospitals, people were most
likely to die at home, in what was often seen as a natural
process.
This common experience of death has changed in
industrialised countries, especially since the 1950s. Med-
ical technology, for example transfusions, respirators
and feeding tubes, in conjunction with medical and legal
systems, has enabled the extension of life far beyond
what was possible in earlier times. Many people now die
in hospitals, often after intensive medical care that lasts
for days, months or years. Death is less commonly expe-
rienced as a natural process and more frequently as the
end-point of medical interventions to maintain life.
End-of-life care includes medical treatment for those
with a prospect of recovery and palliative care to ease
suffering. Medical professionals recommend or some-
times decide the mode of care: in this sense, most death
is medicalised to some degree (Clark 2002).
Artificial extension of life, along with medicalisation,
has undoubtedly benefited many individuals who are
able to live much longer and pain-free than in previous
eras, and to gain satisfaction from their increased lon-
gevity. However, there is also a negative side to this
process: some people experience the period before their
death as painful, distressing or humiliating — so much
so that they would prefer to die sooner rather than later.
For them, technology has enabled or even forced an ex-
tension of suffering. These experiences of suffering, and
witnessing loved ones suffer in their final time alive,
have increased support for access to euthanasia, inter-
preted as a peaceful death at a time and place of one’s
choosing.
Partisans in the contentious debate over euthanasia
use different terms, and there is no agreement among
writers in the area (Gailey 2003, pp. 133–138; Somerville
2001). For convenience, I use the word “euthanasia” to
include the three categories of dying most frequently
used in discussions of the topic. In the first, commonly
called “physician-assisted suicide” or PAS, a physician
provides the means, such as drugs, that enable a person
to end their own life. The second type involves a physician
taking the initiative, such as giving a lethal injection (often
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called “euthanasia” or “active euthanasia” as distinct from
PAS). In the third type, individuals achieve their own de-
sired peaceful death without assistance from others, an act
sometimes called “self-deliverance”.
Most of the public debate (ProCon.org 2013) and volu-
minous writing (Yount 2007) on euthanasia approaches
it from medical, legal or ethical angles. For example, pal-
liative care doctors and nurses may differ about in-
formed consent or about how effective palliative care
can be. When their efforts to reduce suffering hasten
death, this is justified through the principle of double
effect: as long as the intention is to reduce suffering, in-
terventions are justified (Sulmasy and Pellegrino 1999).
Legislators and courts deal with the legal regulation of
end-of-life treatment. In most countries, PAS and active
euthanasia are illegal. In a few places — Netherlands,
Belgium, Colombia, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the
US states of Oregon, Washington and Montana — one
or both are legal or permitted in practice (Côté 2012).
Opponents argue against existing and further legalisa-
tion, seeing it as a slippery slope to abuses including kil-
ling members of vulnerable groups such as the elderly
and people with disabilities (e.g., Smith 1997). One of
their arguments is that improved palliative care should
make euthanasia unnecessary (Jeffrey 2009).
A key ethical issue is whether measures taken to has-
ten death are ever justifiable. Philosophers have exam-
ined this in great detail (Battin 2005). Campaigners on
both sides of the debate have used ethical claims as rhet-
orical tools. It is predictable that campaigners present
their own stances as ethical and their opponents’ stances
as unethical.
I approach this contentious issue from a new angle: an
examination of tactics used by key players to reduce out-
rage from ethical violations. The key question is, what
do those who assist others to die do to reduce potential
outrage over their actions?
In the next section, I introduce a model for examining
tactics used by perpetrators of what others potentially per-
ceive as unjust. Following this, I examine euthanasia —
especially without consent — as an injustice, giving exam-
ples of methods used to reduce outrage and ways to coun-
ter these methods. A key case study is the infamous Nazi
T4 programme. Then I provide a parallel examination of
the denial of euthanasia as an injustice, again giving exam-
ples of methods of reducing outrage and ways to counter
these methods. In the conclusion, I sum up the implica-
tions of this approach for studying the euthanasia debate
and for campaigners who want to oppose one or both in-
justices involved.
Outrage management
Few social scientists have made strategy and tactics, as
deployed in controversial issues, the focus of attention.
Goffman (1970) examined strategic choices in everyday
interpersonal behaviour but did not address strategy
in public debates. Various authors (e.g., Gorsevski 2004;
Jowett and O’Donnell 2006; Mathiesen 2004; Richardson
et al. 1993) have addressed strategy in the realm of dis-
course (mostly fitting into the category of reinterpre-
tation, discussed below), but few have looked beyond
this domain, for example at actions of police and courts.
James Jasper, in his treatment of everyday strategic di-
lemmas, commented, “My research on social movements
showed me just how little social scientists have to say
about strategy” (Jasper 2006, p. xii). Jasper’s goal was to
highlight the complexities of strategic interaction, whereas
my purpose here is to examine regular patterns. For this, I
turn to studies of outrage against injustice.
Social historian Barrington Moore, Jr. (1978) observed
that in every society there is a sense of justice or fair-
ness. Some actions are condemned as unfair, for example
one person hitting another without any pretext. Al-
though some ideas about what is unjust are found in
nearly every society, others develop in particular times
and places. For example, in many places centuries ago,
public executions were commonplace and popularly at-
tended, a practice that many people today would find
abhorrent.
Whenever an action is seen as unjust, unfair, unethical
or otherwise inappropriate, perpetrators risk generating
an adverse popular reaction that can go by labels such as
outrage, anger, concern, disgust or revulsion. To prevent
or reduce such reactions, perpetrators can adopt various
tactics. These can be classified into five categories of out-
rage management (Martin 2007):
 cover-up of the action.
 devaluation of the target.
 reinterpretation of the events, including by lying,
minimising, blaming and framing.
 using official channels to give an appearance of
justice.
 intimidation.
As an example, consider torture. Today it is almost
universally condemned, in part due to the efforts of
human rights movements. Though every government in
the world today officially rejects torture, it is widely
practised (Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights 2013).
Therefore, torturers typically use the following sorts of
outrage-management tactics.
 Cover-up Torture is invariably carried out in secret.
 Devaluation The victims of torture are denigrated,
for example as terrorists, subversives or criminals.
 Reinterpretation When allegations of torture are
made, perpetrators often lie about the occurrence,
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scale or identity of victims. They may minimise the
harm caused by certain forms of interrogation, such
as waterboarding. Senior officials may blame rogue
operators. They may say that what occurred is not
really torture and use terms like “abuse”.
 Official channels When allegations of torture receive
public attention, governments sometimes establish
inquiries that, through their lengthy and procedural
mechanisms, allow public concern to fade.
 Intimidation Victims of torture are commonly
threatened with reprisals to themselves or their
families if they speak out. Some of those who expose
torture, for example whistleblowers or journalists,
are threatened.
Every one of these techniques was used in relation to
torture at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq (Gray and Martin
2007).
Though the characteristic techniques vary from issue
to issue, the same techniques can be observed in diverse
injustices, for example censorship (Yecies 2008), def-
amation (Gray and Martin 2006), sexual harassment
(McDonald et al. 2010), corporate disasters (Engel and
Martin 2006), treatment of refugees (Herd 2006) and
genocide (Martin 2009). Therefore, it seems plausible to
look for these methods of reducing outrage in the case
of euthanasia.
Note that in many issues there are competing injus-
tices or competing ethical considerations. In the case of
torture, for example, the torture itself can be seen as
cruel, but the competing injustice is failure to extract
timely information from the person tortured — if indeed
that is the point of the torture. The analysis of tactics
can apply in either direction, but typically one side has
far more power than the other — a torturer has vastly
more power over the person tortured — and powerful
perpetrators usually have a greater capacity to use tech-
niques to reduce outrage, especially official channels and
intimidation.
It is also worth noting that different people react dif-
ferently to any given event. To speak of public outrage
from an action implies outrage by some significant pro-
portion of the population. For example, the My Lai
massacre — killing of hundreds of Vietnamese civilians
by US troops in 1968 — was seen as many as despicable,
but significant numbers of US soldiers and civilians saw
it as justifiable or even laudable (Kelman and Lawrence
1972; Opton 1972). Nevertheless, the likelihood of adverse
reactions was significant enough for soldiers, commanders
and politicians to use all five methods of reducing outrage
(Gray and Martin 2008).
This same divergence of responses is a characteris-
tic feature of the euthanasia debate, which has evoked
strong emotional responses for decades. To apply the
outrage-management framework, the basic approach
is to examine the actions taken that might prevent or
reduce outrage from an action potentially seen as un-
just. This can be done when there is a divergence of
responses to an action, but with the extra dimension
of looking at tactics used in relation to both euthanasia
and its denial.
Euthanasia as an injustice: tactics and
counter-tactics
When many people see euthanasia as bad — for exam-
ple, as a denial of the right to life or simply as mur-
der — then it is to be expected that perpetrators will
take steps to reduce adverse reactions.
Consider first the notorious Nazi T4 programme,
commonly called the euthanasia programme, seen as so
outrageous that it stigmatised all forms of euthanasia for
decades. The Nazi programme of killing people with dis-
abilities was authorised by Hitler in 1939 and officially
halted in 1941. Unknown to most, the children’s killing
programme was exempted from the halt decree; further-
more, killings continued locally until the end of World
War II.
Some might say that to refer to the T4 programme as
euthanasia is completely inappropriate: there was no
compassionate intention as the Nazis tried to suggest by
using the euphemisms “euthanasia” and “mercy death”
(Friedlander 1995, p. xxi), but simply a programme of
killing given a deceptive patina of legitimacy. Whatever
one’s assessment of the Nazi programme, it can be
analysed in terms of tactics used by the perpetrators to
reduce outrage. It is worthwhile to learn from the tactics
in the Nazi case in order to set up and assess responsible
euthanasia processes, namely ones that do not rely on
the same sorts of tactics.
Cover-up
The Nazi programme was not publicly announced or
explained. Quite the contrary: “Immense pains were
taken to keep T–4’s operations covert” (Burleigh 1994,
p. 162). To run the programme, the obscure agency KdF
(Chancellery of the Führer) was chosen because of its
small size and low visibility (Friedlander 1995, p. 40).
Though the programme was classified top secret,
many knew about it, notably doctors involved. They
were perpetrators and aided in the cover-up. They hid
their actions from those most likely to be disturbed by
and protest against the killings, including relatives,
members of the Catholic Church, and foreign popula-
tions (Aly 1994, pp. 29–32). After public protest led
to the closing of two killing centres, transit institu-
tions were created to add greater secrecy to the process
(Friedlander 1995, p. 108).
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Devaluation
Under Nazi rule, people with disabilities were com-
monly labelled “idiots,” “crazies” and “cripples.” Per-
petrators used the expression “life unworthy of life”
(Friedlander 1995, p. xxii). The eugenics movement,
strong in Germany as well as some other countries, de-
valued anyone deemed to have defective genes (Proctor
1988). The Nazis produced propaganda films devaluing
people with disabilities (Burleigh 1994, pp. 183–219). For
example, the 1936 film Erbkrank was intended “to cri-
minalise, degrade and dehumanise the mentally and phy-
sically handicapped so as to justify compulsorily sterilising
them” (Burleigh 1994, p. 183). Devaluation, at a psycho-
logical level (Bandura 1986, pp. 375–389), also helped en-
able the killings.
Reinterpretation
Language is the most obvious part of reinterpretation: as
noted, the Nazis used the terms “euthanasia” and “mercy
death” to describe the killings, which otherwise would
be called murder. Another reinterpretation technique
was to rationalise killings by saying that people in insti-
tutions were expensive drains on the Nazi state when fa-
cilities were needed for injured soldiers.
Outright lying was another standard reinterpretation
technique. For example, patients from institutions were
transferred to other centres for killing, with guards in
white coats in attendance to make it seem like a med-
ically supervised process. Parents were told that their
children were being sent to special centres where they
would receive better treatment. Relatives were sent death
certificates with false information about the cause of
death (Burleigh 1994, pp. 105, 151; Friedlander 1995,
pp. 85, 98–106). To disguise the central direction of the
programme, physicians and administrators used pseudo-
nyms (Friedlander 1995, p. 103). Lying can serve as a
form of cover-up; it fits within the category of reinter-
pretation when relatives knew that something had hap-
pened — death of a loved one — but were deceived
about how and when it occurred.
Official channels
The programme was never given legal approval; Hitler
refused this because the German people would not sup-
port it (Friedlander 1995, p. 154). Instead, Hitler wrote a
letter privately authorising the programme and this letter
was used to win over some participants (Burleigh 1994,
pp. 112–113; Friedlander 1995, pp. 67, 154). A formal
meeting served to win over sceptical legal professionals
(Burleigh 1994, pp. 172–173; Friedlander 1995, p. 122).
In August 1941, Hitler halted the programme, but
this official response to protest was deceptive. The “halt”
only applied to killing centres and did not apply to
children. T4 continued, with physicians killing adults
using starvation and injections (Burleigh 1994, p. 180;
Friedlander 1995, p. 154).
It was only after the war that official channels, namely
courts, were used against the perpetrators. After 1947,
the German Federal Republic judiciary mostly made de-
cisions that allowed T4 participants to rejoin German
professions, for example by terminating trials, acquit-
ting defendants or giving lenient sentences (Bryant
2005, p. 218).
Intimidation
Speaking out against Nazi policies was always risky.
Parents who refused permission for their children with
disabilities to be sent away were threatened with being
sent to work camps or having all their children taken
into state custody (Burleigh 1994, p. 166; Friedlander
1995, pp. 59–60). After Bishop Galen’s sermon
condemning the T4 programme (discussed later), ordin-
ary Germans found to possess, circulate or discuss the
sermon were subject to reprisals including losing jobs,
being sent to concentration camps or execution
(Burleigh 1994, pp. 178–180).
The perpetrators of the Nazi T4 programme thus re-
lied on all five types of tactics to reduce outrage — a
very strong indication of the potential for popular out-
rage about the programme. This is exactly what is to be
expected using this analysis of tactics: when powerful
perpetrators anticipate resistance, they are likely to use a
range of tactics that reduce outrage.
What then about challenging the programme? Meth-
ods of doing this can be categorised into five types of
counter-tactics to the five types of outrage-reduction
tactics.
Exposure
The key to challenging cover-up is to get information
to receptive audiences. Information about the T4 pro-
gramme gradually leaked out via observations and in-
ferences by relatives and local people (Burleigh 1994,
pp. 162–164; Friedlander 1995, p. 111). The break-
through event was a 1941 pastoral letter by Clemens
August von Galen, bishop of Münster, which was
reprinted and widely distributed throughout Germany
(Burleigh 1994, p. 178; Friedlander 1995, p. 115).
Validation
To challenge devaluation, the victims needed to be con-
ceived as humans with lives worth living. Von Galen
(1941), referring to the targets of the T4 programme,
said “we are dealing with human beings, with our neigh-
bours, brothers and sisters,” describing them posi-
tively in terms of vital relationships. (Incidentally, von
Galen was far less vocal about the value of Jewish lives
[Griech-Polelle 2001]).
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Reframing
To counter techniques of lying, minimising, blaming
and framing, the programme had to be named as an
injustice, namely killing pure and simple. One asylum
director, Heinrich Hermann, used the word “killing” in
criticising T4 to visiting euthanasia planners, who were
disconcerted by the direct language: “These institutional
murderers with civil servant status were not equal to a
confrontation with the naked word ‘killing’” (Aly 1994,
p. 34).
Mobilisation
There are two ways to respond to official channels used
to give a deceptive appearance of justice. One is to avoid
or discredit the official channels. In the long term,
discrediting the Nazi regime accomplished this, so much
so that virtually any Nazi policy was discredited by asso-
ciation. The other response is to not rely on official
channels for redress but instead to mobilise support
among the public, for example by talking to individuals,
publicising the issues, holding private or public meet-
ings, forming networks and groups, and making public
protests.
For many months prior to von Galen’s pastoral letter,
various individual opponents of T4 — especially church
people — wrote letters to or had meetings with gov-
ernment officials, such as the Ministry of Justice, but
this insider approach achieved little (Burleigh 1994,
pp. 166–176; Friedlander 1995, pp. 113–114, 121–122).
These were significant signs of opposition but they were
not so effective as mobilising public support: they essen-
tially relied on an official channel, namely appealing to
government officials, that gave only the appearance of
offering a solution.
Resistance
The counter to intimidation is to continue taking action
against the injustice and to expose evidence of intimi-
dation in order to create greater outrage. Those who op-
posed the euthanasia programme at the time, in word
or deed, displayed incredible courage (Gallagher 1995,
pp. 137–146, 186–203).
In summary, the Nazi T4 programme is an ideal illus-
tration of an injustice in which all the methods of reduc-
ing and fostering outrage can be observed.
In the current debate over euthanasia, the issues are
not as clear-cut as in the Nazi case. Nevertheless, the
same sorts of methods are involved. As a typical ex-
ample, consider the case of a patient, with a terminal ill-
ness, whose doctor believes is suffering unnecessarily
and would be better off dead. Suppose the doctor, with-
out informing or obtaining permission from anyone,
gives this patient a lethal drug dose. This can occur
whether or not active euthanasia is legal (Kuhse et al.
1996; Magnusson 2002).
The primary means of preventing outrage is cover-up:
the doctor tells no one about intentionally hastening
death. Other doctors or perhaps relatives might suspect
what the doctor has done, but not have sufficient evi-
dence or incentive to expose it. If there is a suspicion of
foul play, then the doctor may use reinterpretation, say-
ing the person was going down quickly or claiming not
to have been involved. In such situations, devaluation
may or may not be used. The doctor seldom has access
to official channels to reduce outrage, nor has any means
of intimidating critics.
This assessment shows that covert euthanasia by indi-
vidual doctors is quite different — in terms of available
methods for reducing outrage — to the Nazi T4
programme. The primary techniques available to individ-
ual doctors are cover-up and reinterpretation. Without
the backing of a powerful institution, such as the Nazi
state, other methods of reducing outrage are unavailable
or of limited assistance.
In practice, covert euthanasia of this sort ranges from
sincere efforts to minimise suffering done on an ad hoc
basis to regular killing that is more readily labelled crim-
inal, as in the case of the British serial-killer doctor
Harold Shipman (Whittle and Richie 2004).
When euthanasia has been legalised, a different pat-
tern emerges. Following a set of legal guidelines, physi-
cians may assist a person to end their life (as in Oregon)
or administer a lethal injection (as in the Netherlands).
Consider an instance of legal euthanasia in which the
patient has a terminal illness, is suffering, requests
death and is provided with lethal drugs that can be
self-administered.
Cover-up
There is no cover-up: the person dying knows quite well
that the purpose of taking the drugs is to cause death. In
some cases relatives and friends are present.
Devaluation
Whether devaluation is involved is a matter of debate.
Critics of euthanasia might say the person’s life, by being
shortened, has been devalued by that fact; supporters
might say that euthanasia actually involves respect for a
person’s autonomy and for their experience of life, which
has become intolerable.
Reinterpretation
Those involved with legal euthanasia do not lie about
what is happening: they are obliged to open about it.
There is no evidence that they minimise the significance
of what they are doing; many find it distressing (e.g.,
Kade 2000). They cannot blame someone else for the
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death: they have to accept responsibility. The most im-
portant reinterpretation technique used is framing: they
say that what occurs is voluntary and intended to reduce
suffering — not an unfair termination of life and cer-
tainly not killing. For example, the Dutch government
brochure Euthanasia: The Netherlands’ New Rules de-
fines euthanasia as “the termination of life by a doctor at
the patient’s request, with the aim of putting an end to
unbearable suffering with no prospect of improvement”
(Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, n.d.).
Some would say that the Oregon state model is less
than fully open, in that deaths in which physicians pro-
vide assistance are officially called natural deaths. The
Swiss model is more transparent: legal oversight is pro-
vided by the criminal justice system; police investigate
every death for legal compliance; and some right-to-die
societies film deaths and immediately provide videotapes
to the police (Ziegler 2009). This also allows research
into euthanasia deaths (Ogden et al. 2010) and thus
greater understanding.
Official channels
When proper procedures are followed, official channels
authorise the process of dying. Critics of euthanasia al-
lege that consent sometimes has not been given or that
cases are not reported as they are supposed to be (Jeffrey
2009, pp. 63–73, 84; Smith 1997, pp. 90–114). However,
it is very difficult for critics to use complaint procedures
to challenge decisions, because the laws authorising eu-
thanasia provide protection to doctors and others in-
volved if formal procedures are followed.
Intimidation
There is little evidence that critics have been threatened
or penalised. (See, for example, Thomasma et al. 1998).
In summary, legal euthanasia involves few of the tech-
niques typically used by powerful perpetrators to reduce
outrage from injustice. There is little or no cover-up, lit-
tle devaluation, reinterpretation only by framing, and lit-
tle intimidation. The one exception is official channels:
laws and judicial practice provide powerful protection
for doctors and others involved in the process.
Note that this analysis does not by itself provide an en-
dorsement of legal euthanasia. All it shows is an absence
of most of the techniques commonly used by powerful
perpetrators of actions potentially seen as unjust.
In this section, I have outlined the common tactics
used by perpetrators to reduce outrage over euthanasia
and some of the counter-tactics that can be used by
those opposed to euthanasia. The Nazis, in killing hun-
dreds of thousands of people with disabilities, used the
full range of techniques for reducing outrage: cover-up,
devaluation, reinterpretation, official channels and in-
timidation. On the other hand, individual doctors who
practise euthanasia, where it is illegal, typically rely pri-
marily on cover-up. When euthanasia is legal, the pat-
tern is quite different: only official channels might be
seen as tools to reduce outrage.
So far I have analysed euthanasia in terms of tactics
used to reduce concern. A different analysis, to which I
now turn, is of tactics used to reduce concern about the
opposite injustice: refusal of euthanasia.
Denial of euthanasia as an injustice: tactics and
counter-tactics
Many people believe that a person in great suffering,
with little chance of relief, and who wants to die, should
be allowed to do so (ProCon.org 2013). To deny such a
death can, to them, be seen as inhumane, and they may
be disturbed, concerned, upset or outraged. Because of
this possible reaction, those who prevent such deaths
may act to reduce adverse reactions. My aim here is to
look at the tactics used for this purpose. Given that tac-
tics can vary from country to country and time to time,
I take some examples from Australia in recent years, for
which the evidence is particularly striking.
Cover-up
The first type of cover-up concerns the suffering that
many individuals experience in being denied a desired
peaceful death, including pain, discomfort and indignity.
Information about such experiences is not censored offi-
cially, but is seldom publicised by doctors or relatives.
The second type of cover-up is about ways to achieve
a peaceful death. This sort of information is not com-
monly publicised. It is relatively easy to learn about
death from violent means, because of news reporting
and television shows showing murders and suicides, but
there are relatively few detailed descriptions of desired
deaths using drugs, exit bags or other methods (for ex-
amples, see Ogden 2010a, b).
The Australian federal government has taken cover-up
to another level by passing a law against giving informa-
tion, through electronic means, about how to die. That
means that a website giving information about obtaining
the lethal drug Nembutal and how much to take for a
peaceful death is illegal. It is also illegal to offer this sort
of information over the telephone. This law is aimed at
the organisation Exit International, which specialises in
offering end-of-life information. Philip Nitschke, the dir-
ector of Exit, and his partner Fiona Stewart wrote a
book, The Peaceful Pill Handbook, giving detailed infor-
mation about various ways to die (Nitschke and Stewart
2006). It is banned in Australia.
The Australian federal government proposed introduc-
ing compulsory Internet filtering. Ostensibly aimed pri-
marily at paedophilia websites, the target list of websites
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included euthanasia sites (Duffy 2009; Electronic Frontiers
Australia 2010).
Nitschke runs workshops about end-of-life options. In
Australia, he is restricted about what he can say in a
public meeting, so for more detailed information — such
as that given in The Peaceful Pill Handbook — the meet-
ing is closed and everyone in attendance has to join Exit
International and, to prevent prosecution, sign a dis-
claimer stating that “none of the information provided
in this workshop will be used in any way to advise,
counsel or assist in the act of suicide, either my own, or
any other persons.” Nitschke has run the same work-
shops in other countries, including Britain, Canada, New
Zealand and the US. In several cities, meetings have had
to be cancelled or moved at the last moment after the
organisation providing a venue — a church or library,
for example — has withdrawn permission to use its fa-
cilities. Sometimes this withdrawal of permission has
been despite constitutional free-speech guarantees such
as found in Canada and the US (Bermingham 2009).
Devaluation
People desiring to end their life often are assumed to be
depressed (Jeffrey 2009, p. 81) or experiencing “demor-
alization syndrome” (Kissane et al. 2000), namely suffer-
ing a mental illness. Some of those who assist others to
die have been denigrated. For example, the US media
dubbed right-to-die activist Jack Kevorkian “Dr. Death”
and subjected him to “caustic character assaults” (Gailey
2003, p. 190).
Reinterpretation
Some critics say euthanasia is not appropriate because
suffering from pain, breathlessness and nausea can be al-
leviated by well-resourced palliative care (Jeffrey 2009).
Such claims may downplay the suffering associated with
incapacity and loss of autonomy or due to less-than-
effective palliative care. Reinterpretation by blaming can
occur when a person’s desire to die is attributed to be-
liefs considered by some to be inappropriate. For ex-
ample, some people believe they are a burden to their
families — a belief sometimes fostered by family mem-
bers — and hence it might be better if they were dead;
reinterpretation by blaming can occur when such moti-
vations are incorrectly attributed to individuals. Probably
the most important reinterpretation is framing: seeing
life as inherently valuable, irrespective of suffering.
Official channels
In most countries, where euthanasia is illegal, appealing
to medical or legal authorities to hasten one’s death is
futile: official channels endorse the denial of euthanasia
rather than providing relief from it. Sometimes it is pos-
sible to obtain covert assistance to die from a sympathetic
doctor or nurse; however, making a public request for
such assistance actually makes it more difficult to obtain,
because medical personnel know they will then be under
greater scrutiny (Nitschke and Stewart 2006).
Intimidation
In most countries, assisting someone to die is illegal.
One possible outcome is being charged with murder;
Jack Kevorkian was brought to trial for murder on se-
veral occasions (Nicol and Wylie 2006, pp. 184–195).
Trials of individuals for assisting a death send a warning
to others to avoid this risk. Even short of a trial, convic-
tion and jail, the prospect of being investigated can
cause individuals to avoid assisting a death or speaking
out about their past or likely future involvement in
someone’s death.
Each of these methods of reducing awareness, concern
and action against the denial of euthanasia can be chal-
lenged. Some examples follow.
Exposure
In recent years, a few individuals — such as Derek
Humphry (2002), Jack Kevorkian (Nicol and Wylie 2006)
and Philip Nitschke (Nitschke and Stewart 2005) — have
dramatically increased awareness of the issue of eutha-
nasia (Côté 2012). Their initiatives have received extensive
media coverage. As individuals, they are the most public
face of voluntary euthanasia campaigning.
The spread of the Internet has made censorship of
options for dying far more difficult. To outflank the
Australian government’s ban on electronic communi-
cation of options for dying, Exit International put its
phone line in New Zealand and hosts its website outside
Australia. The Peaceful Pill Handbook is available in
both printed and electronic editions and can readily be
purchased in Australia from foreign outlets with little
risk of detection.
Validation
Whenever a person behaves with dignity, compassion
and other valued traits, their behaviour gains in stature.
The most important way of countering devaluation in
the euthanasia debate has been to personalise the issue.
On several occasions, individuals with terminal ill-
nesses have spoken out in support of being able to end
their lives when, where and how they choose — and
spoken in a calm, rational, sensible fashion, often despite
great suffering (Nitschke and Stewart 2005, pp. 256–266;
Syme 2008, pp. 231–244). Such individuals evoke sym-
pathy and challenge the image of depression and
irrationality.
The same applies to advocates of euthanasia. For
example, Rodney Syme, a doctor based in Melbourne,
spoke in public about his assistance to patients who
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wished to die, and gradually became more prominent in
support of voluntary euthanasia. His status as a doctor,
his sensitivity to suffering and his sensible discussion of
the pros and cons of the issue help to validate the po-
sition he advocates (Syme 2008).
Reframing
Advocates frame the issue in ways that emphasise what
they believe are the key injustices: unnecessary suffering
and the denial of the right to die. Language is important:
“death with dignity” and “right to die” are ways of fra-
ming the issue that avoid the negative connotations of
“euthanasia” and “suicide,” not to mention “killing” and
“murder.” Some societies have changed their names
from “Voluntary Euthanasia” to “Dignity in Dying” or
related names to avoid connotations of the word eutha-
nasia. The Hemlock Society in the US has become Com-
passion and Choices.
Mobilisation
Supporters of voluntary euthanasia have used a wide
range of methods to promote their goals, including cre-
ating organisations, holding meetings, advising indivi-
duals, publishing leaflets and articles, seeking media
coverage and, in some cases, supporting those who defy
the laws, in what might be called civil disobedience.
These organisations and activities collectively can be said
to constitute a social movement (Côté 2012; Hillyard
and Dombrink 2001; McInerney 2000).
Some organisations seek legal change largely through
putting pressure on governments, an approach that can
be seen as using official channels. Others, for instance
Exit International, advocate direct action, namely enab-
ling individuals to obtain knowledge and tools for their
own deaths (Nitschke and Stewart 2005).
Resistance
Some supporters of voluntary euthanasia have defied
laws. Jack Kevorkian developed a machine to allow peo-
ple to end their lives and used it in the face of law-
makers seeking to prosecute him. (Eventually he was
jailed for murder [Nicol and Wylie 2006]). Philip Nitschke,
in his book The Peaceful Pill Handbook and in Exit semi-
nars, provides information to people on how they can end
their lives — though some of the methods involve break-
ing the law. For example, many Australians have visited
Mexico and legally purchased Nembutal but then illegally
brought it back to Australia in case they feel the need to
use it.
In summary, in countries in which euthanasia is illegal,
there is an ongoing struggle between its opponents and
supporters. In some countries, for example Australia, the
measures taken by opponents include cover-up, devalu-
ation, reinterpretation, official channels and intimidation —
every one of the techniques typically used to reduce outrage
over something seen by others as unjust.
In this analysis, I have not tried to assess whether re-
fusing people’s requests to die actually is an injustice.
The analysis here is of tactics. It is possible to say that
some of the tactics used by opponents of people’s re-
quests to die are characteristic of acting in ways that re-
duce outrage over injustice.
Conclusion
In many studies of euthanasia, the focus is on medical,
legal or moral dimensions of the issue. Here a different
focus is introduced: on tactics used to reduce or increase
outrage. This analysis is based on the observation that
the same types of tactics are used in a wide range of
areas — from sexual harassment to genocide — by
powerful perpetrators to reduce public discontent about
something perceived as wrong. Powerful perpetrators —
especially when backed by government — can use the
techniques of cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, of-
ficial channels and intimidation. On the other hand,
weak perpetrators, such as doctors who euthanise pa-
tients without official sanction and without significant
resources, typically rely mostly on cover-up.
By highlighting and classifying the tactics used in a
contentious area, it is possible to say whether the tactics
are characteristic of a powerful perpetrator doing some-
thing potentially perceived as unfair (Martin 2007). This
approach is well suited to the euthanasia debate because
there are two potential injustices involved: the injustice
of euthanasia and the injustice of denying euthanasia.
An examination of the infamous Nazi T4 programme
reveals ample evidence that the perpetrators used all five
methods to reduce outrage. The obvious inference is that
the programme, in the eyes of many parents, relatives and
other citizens, was highly objectionable, which is exactly
what historians of the programme have documented.
The other potential injustice is denial of euthanasia.
Here, also, there is evidence, at least in some places, of
all five methods of reducing outrage. The implication is
that many people believe that this denial is unjust —
again, something that is expected, given that opinion
polls reveal considerable support for euthanasia in ap-
propriate circumstances. On the other hand, in places
such as the Netherlands and Oregon where euthanasia is
legal, there is little evidence of the methods for reducing
outrage. Some critics are indeed outraged by the practices
in these places, but authorities and supporters do not
seem to have adopted methods to suppress opposition.
One value of this analysis is showing ways for chal-
lengers to increase outrage over practices they oppose.
To do this, it is useful to expose the actions, validate
those who are the targets, interpret the actions as unjust,
mobilise support (and avoid or discredit official channels),
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and resist intimidation. Groups in the right-to-die move-
ment have used most of these methods. It is noteworthy
that many voluntary euthanasia groups put much of their
energy into official channels, namely seeking law reform,
which actually dampens outrage.
Given that two competing injustices are involved —
euthanasia and its denial — analysis of tactics provides a
way of judging appropriate behaviour. Those who believe
in a fair treatment of the issues can ask the following
sorts of questions.
 Are we open about what is happening and do we
allow others to present their viewpoints without
hindrance?
 Are we respectful of everyone involved?
 Are we truthful? Do we accept responsibility?
 Do we encourage as many people as possible to be
involved with the issue, whatever their viewpoint?
 Do we act to reduce threats to and coercion of
anyone involved?
The framework presented here for examining tactics
in the euthanasia controversy can be used to examine
tactics used in other controversial health issues, such as
abortion and stem-cell research. The basic approach is
to examine the methods used by powerful players on
each side. If these fit a consistent pattern of covering up
adverse information, devaluing others, reinterpreting the
events using lying, blaming and minimising, using offi-
cial channels to give an appearance of justice without
the substance, and intimidating opponents, this is char-
acteristic of the behaviour of powerful perpetrators of in-
justice. If, on the other hand, the tactics fit a consistent
pattern of being open about information, respecting
everyone including opponents, avoiding deception and
blaming, not relying on authoritative endorsement, and
avoiding intimidation, this is characteristic of an ap-
proach that is open and honest.
A consistent pattern of tactics does not indicate
whether a side is right or ethical, but it does suggest
whether or not it is “playing fair” and allowing audiences
to obtain information, study arguments and assess the
issue free of deception, threats and inducements. The
normal approach to health controversies is to assess the
issues to decide which arguments are correct or which
actions are appropriate; actions to support one’s pre-
ferred stance may not be studied or questioned, whereas
unsavoury ones taken by opponents are castigated. By
looking for patterns in tactics, a different perspective is
provided on the controversy. Sometimes actions are
more revealing than words.
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